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China’s policy response to the global financial and economic 
crisis was early, large, and well-designed. Although Chinese 
financial institutions had little exposure to the toxic financial 
assets  that  brought  down  many  large  Western  investment 
banks and other financial firms, China’s leadership recognized 
that  its  dependence  on  exports  meant  that  it  was  acutely 
vulnerable to a global recession. Thus they did not subscribe 
to the view sometimes described as “decoupling,” the idea that 
Asian countries could passively weather the financial storm 
that originated in the United States and other advanced indus-
trial economies. They understood that absent a vigorous policy 
response China inevitably would suffer from the backwash of 
a sharp economic slowdown in its largest export markets—the 
United States and Europe.
While it is now widely understood that China was the 
first globally significant economy to begin to recover from the 
crisis, critics nonetheless increasingly charge that the stimulus 
program has substantial flaws and that China’s early economic 
recovery cannot be sustained. One prominent critic has gone 
so far as to suggest that the stimulus has created a debt-fueled 
bubble that will collapse, causing China’s growth to plunge 
to only 2 percent.1 But the analysis below suggests these criti-
cisms are exaggerated.
China and the Crisis
In the fall of 2007, just before the global crisis, the Chinese 
authorities  tightened  monetary  policy  and  took  steps  to 
curtail  an  incipient  property  bubble.  But  when  the  global 
crisis intensified in the fall of 2008 the authorities reversed 
economic course by launching a policy of monetary easing in 
order to offset the additional drag on China’s growth caused 
by the sharp slowdown in global trade. First, they cancelled 
the lending quotas that had previously restricted the ability of 
banks to fully meet the demand for loans from their custom-
ers.2 Second, to ensure that a sufficient supply of funds would 
be available to meet this demand, the government repeatedly 
reduced the share of deposits that banks had to place with 
the central bank. Banks were not necessarily forced to expand 
their lending in 2009, as has often been asserted. It was in 
their economic self-interest to do so since the interest rate that 
they could charge on loans was several times what they earned 
either on funds they were required to place with the central 
bank or on funds lent in the interbank market.3 Thus, the 
1. Aki Ito and Patrick Riai, “Rogoff Says China Crisis May Trigger Regional 
Slump,” February 24, 2010, www.bloomberg.com (accessed March 5, 2010).
2. Mao Lijun and Wang Bo, “Lending Caps to Reduce Liquidity,” China 
Daily, January 21, 2010, 10.
3. The central bank pays 1.62 percent on reserves and in December 2008 
interbank market lending rates ranged from 1.0058 percent for loans of one-
month maturity to 2.3579 percent for loans of one-year maturity. In contrast, 
in December 2008 the average interest rate on a one-year loan was 6.64 
percent; see People’s Bank of China, Monetary Policy Analysis Small Group, 
Report on the Implementation of Monetary Policy, Fourth Quarter 2009, Febru-
ary 11, 2010, 6, 11, and 21, www.pbc.gov.cn (accessed on February 11, 2010). N u m b e r   P b 1 0 - 7  m a r c h   2 0 1 0
2
government’s first step in monetary easing was to increase the 
supply of loanable funds.
The  authorities  simultaneously  took  steps  to  increase 
the real demand for loans. First, they repeatedly lowered the 
benchmark interest rates that guide the rates that banks charge 
on loans of various maturities. These cuts took the benchmark 
rate on a five-year loan from 7.74 percent in September 2008 
to 5.76 percent at year-end. Second, they made deeper cuts 
in the rates for mortgage loans. Prior to the fall of 2008 the 
rate that applied to mortgage loans that banks made to indi-
viduals to purchase owner-occupied property was 0.85 times 
the benchmark rate. Beginning in September the government 
reduced this multiple to 0.7. So, for example, the combined 
effect of a reduction in the benchmark five-year loan rate and 
the adjustment in the mortgage factor meant that the interest 
rate a potential home buyer would pay on a mortgage with a 
term of five or more years was reduced by two-fifths, from 6.66 
to 4.16 percent. This meant that the monthly payment on a 
20-year mortgage was reduced by 18.6 percent.4 For property 
investors the 40 percent minimum downpayment on a mort-
gage, introduced in the fall of 2007, was scaled back to 20 
percent. And the compulsory penalty interest rate that applied 
to property investors, which had been set at 1.1 times the 
benchmark rate starting in September 2007, was eliminated.5 
A few months later, in January 2009, the authorities reduced 
to two years (from five years) the period investors must hold a 
4. People’s Bank of China, Monetary Policy Analysis Small Group, Report 
on the Implementation of Monetary Policy, Fourth Quarter 2008, February 23, 
2009, 46, www.pbc.gov.cn (accessed on February 24, 2009).
5. Banks, however, were advised that they “should appropriately raise” the 
downpayment ratio and the interest rate on mortgages that were not for first-
time buyers, were not for owner-occupied units, and were for high-end rather 
than ordinary property.
property in order to avoid a sales tax when a property is sold.6 
The result of these policy initiatives was a massive increase 
in bank lending, particularly in the first half of 2009, when 
domestic currency loans outstanding increased by RMB7.4 
trillion, three times the increase in the first half of 2008. Loan 
growth moderated substantially in the second half, so for the 
year as a whole bank lending in domestic currency increased by 
RMB9.59 trillion, about twice the RMB4.91 trillion increase 
in  bank  lending  in  domestic  currency  in  2008.7  Mortgage 
lending was a large part of the loan expansion story in 2009. 
Individual mortgage loans outstanding increased by RMB1.4 
trillion, about five times the increase of 2008.8 
Shortly  after  the  authorities  launched  their  policy  of 
monetary easing in September 2008 they also announced a 
RMB4 trillion stimulus program, entirely devoted to invest-
ment expenditures. This program began immediately in the 
fourth quarter of 2008 and extends through 2010. In practice 
the  stimulus  program  is  closely  linked  to  monetary  easing 
since the plan from the outset was that it would be financed 
primarily by increased bank lending rather than through the 
government budget. 
The results of China’s stimulus program were impressive, 
making China the first globally significant economy to begin 
to recover from the global economic recession. Measured on 
a  quarter-over-quarter  basis  the  economy  bottomed  out  in 
the fourth quarter of 2008, when economic growth slowed to 
only 4.3 percent. As the stimulus package began to take hold 
China’s growth accelerated sharply to 9.5 and 11.4 percent, 
respectively, in the first and second quarters of 2009.9 In Janu-
ary 2010 the statistical authorities placed the year-over-year 
GDP growth in 2009 at 8.7 percent, well above the pace that 
most external observers had expected a year earlier.10
shortComings of the stimulus?
China’s growth in 2009 was impressive compared with the 
absolute downturns in economic output in the United States, 
Europe,  Japan,  and  many  other  developed  economies  and 
6. “China Imposes Tougher Home Sale Tax to Control Bubble,” People’s 
Daily Online, December 10, 2010, http://english.people.com (accessed on 
December 10, 2009).
7. People’s Bank of China, Monetary Policy Analysis Small Group, Report on 
the Implementation of Monetary Policy, Fourth Quarter 2009, 3.
8. People’s Bank of China, Monetary Policy Analysis Small Group, Report on 
the Implementation of Monetary Policy, Fourth Quarter 2009, 48.
9. People’s Bank of China, Statistical Investigation Office, An Analysis of 
Macroeconomic Trends in the Fourth Quarter of 2009, January 29, 2010, www.
pbc.gov.cn (accessed on January 30, 2010).
10. National Bureau of Statistics of China, National Economy: Recovery and 
Posing in the Good Direction in 2009, January 21, 2010, www.stats.gov.cn 
(accessed on January 21, 2010).
Much of the criticism that is directed at 
China’s stimulus ignores or understates 
both the substantial advantages that accrue 
to China as a result of coming through 
the crisis with strong economic growth 
momentum and fails to appreciate the steps 
that the authorities already have taken 
that head off the potential adverse effects 
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was the fastest growth of any emerging market. But 2009 was 
the second consecutive year of slowing Chinese growth and 
8.7 percent was the slowest pace of expansion recorded since 
2001. Moreover, critics, both in China and abroad, argue that 
growth recovery in 2009 was unsustainable since it relied on 
a burst of investment financed largely by an unprecedented 
increase  in  bank  lending.11  According  to  the  critics,  the 
massive stimulus program would have several adverse conse-
quences. First, in the short run it created bubbles in the prop-
erty and equity markets as funds lent for investment leaked 
into these markets. Second, in the medium term the massive 
investment program financed with the expanded supply of 
credit would inevitably lead to excess industrial capacity and 
thus, with a slight lag, would put downward pressure on prices 
and firm profits.12 That, in turn, would impair the ability of 
firms to amortize their bank debt and thus likely lead to a 
large increase in nonperforming loans. Potentially this would 
require the state to recapitalize the banks once again, with 
adverse consequences for the government’s fiscal position. 
Third, the critics argue that the stimulus undermines China’s 
strong fiscal position. China’s budget deficit barely topped 2 
percent in 2009, a small fraction of the deficits recorded in the 
United States and some other advanced industrial countries. 
This  meant  China’s  outstanding  government  debt  remained 
stable at only 20 percent of GDP, again a small fraction of most 
high-income economies. But, the critics charge, this obscures a 
massive increase in hidden government debt.
Finally, the critics charge that the stimulus program exac-
erbated China’s structural imbalances and set back the effort 
to transition to growth that would rely more on the expansion 
of private consumption expenditure rather than the growth of 
investment and exports.13
While China’s economy is marked by substantial imbal-
ances, all of these criticisms of China’s stimulus program seem 
exaggerated. At a minimum they do not recognize adequately 
that the alternative to the massive stimulus program was an 
even  sharper  drop  in  economic  growth.  Moreover,  while 
China faces a substantial challenge in sustaining economic 
growth in a postcrisis world, its immediate challenge is similar 
to that faced by many other countries—how soon and at what 
pace to reduce its stimulus.
11. Stephen Roach, “An Unbalanced World Is Again Compounding Its Imbal-
ances,” Financial Times, October 7, 2009, 23.
12. European Chamber, Overcapacity in China: Causes, Impacts and Recom-
mendations, November 26, 2009, 20, www.europeanchamber.com.cn (accessed 
on March 3, 2010).
13. Michael Pettis, “Sharing the Pain: The Global Struggle Over Savings,” 
Carnegie Policy Brief 84 (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, November 2009); “China Has Been Misread by Bulls and Bears Alike,” 
Financial Times, February 26, 2010, 11.
Much of the criticism that is directed at China’s stimulus 
ignores or understates both the substantial advantages that 
accrue to China as a result of coming through the crisis with 
strong economic growth momentum and fails to appreciate 
the steps that the authorities already have taken that head 
off the potential adverse effects of the stimulus predicted by 
the critics. The criticism also gives short shrift to the advan-
tages that accrue to China as a result of its long-standing very 
conservative fiscal and financial regulatory policies.
Excessive Lending and a Property Bubble?
The charge of excessive lending growth, for example, fails to 
take into account that the authorities initiated steps to slow 
lending growth as early as mid-2009. Increased window guid-
ance and other initiatives slowed lending dramatically in the 
second half of the year. Although lending spiked upward in 
January 2010, the China Banking Regulatory Commission 
(CBRC) announced that month that it would take tougher 
measures to moderate the pace of lending over the balance of 
2010. It reinstated mandatory lending quotas on individual 
banks and imposed tougher regulations to prevent banks from 
disbursing most of their lending quota in the first quarter or 
two of the year.14 It also raised the required reserve ratio by 
50 basis points in both January and February, cutting banks’ 
excess  reserves  and  further  signaling  the  transition  away 
from the “moderately loose monetary policy” of 2009 to the 
“moderately  loose  monetary  policy  implemented  flexibly” 
policy of 2010.
Second,  the  CBRC  has  taken  other  steps  to  curtail 
the expansion of bank credit. In October 2009, in what he 
described as a “historic decision,” Chairman Liu Mingkang 
ruled that banks would no longer be able to count subordi-
nated debt and hybrid capital as part of their tier-two capital.15 
14. The aggregate quota for the increase in bank loans outstanding in 2010 
was set at RMB7.5 trillion. Moreover, the CBRC announced that each bank 
should advance in each month no more than 12 percent of its annual quota 
and in each quarter no more than 30 percent of its annual quota. This would 
limit the expansion of loans outstanding to RMB900 billion per month, 
although the authorities acknowledged that this limit would be exceeded in 
January since the new regulations were not announced until the second half 
of January when new lending had already exceeded RMB1 trillion; see Mao 
Lijun and Wang Bo, “Lending Caps to Reduce Liquidity.”
15. Liu Mingkang, “Chinese Bankers Carry Hopes for Future Balanced 
Development,” speech to the Asian Financial Forum in Hong Kong, January 
20, 2010, www.cbrc.gov.cn (accessed on February 18, 2010); “China Lenders 
Asked to Rein in Record Loans,” People’s Daily Online, August 21, 2009, 
http://english.people.com (accessed on August 21, 2009). The main concern 
of the CBRC was that by 2009 a little over half of the subordinated bonds 
sold by banks had been purchased by other banks. These large cross-holdings 
of subordinated debt do not add any capital to the banking system as a whole, 
meaning that high capital adequacy ratios reported by individual banks N u m b e r   P b 1 0 - 7  m a r c h   2 0 1 0
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During the lending boom of 2009 banks kept their capital 
adequacy ratios from falling sharply by selling large amounts 
of  subordinated  debt.16  Raising  the  required  reserve  ratio 
and disallowing subordinated debt as a source of capital now 
requires banks to either raise more equity capital or slow down 
their lending and other activities that require capital backing.
Third, just as they had in the fall of 2007, the authori-
ties focused special attention on moderating the growth of the 
property market. In December 2009 the government rein-
stated the 40 percent minimum downpayment for mortgages 
made to property investors and lengthened to five years the 
period that property investors must hold a property to avoid 
paying sales tax when a property is sold.17 Both these measures 
cut the potential profits of property investors and disincen-
tivized speculators. These moves dramatically cut the pace of 
property sales in late 2009 and early 2010 and are likely to be 
followed by price moderation in the housing market.
Even if the government is less successful in moderating 
property prices this time around than it was in 2008, it is 
important  to  recognize  that  even  a  major  property  price 
correction in China would not have the systemic implications 
that it had in the United States and several other major indus-
trial countries in the current crisis. The reason is simple: There 
is much less leverage in China’s property market than there 
overstate the soundness of the banking system as a whole. Fang Huilei, Zhang 
Man, Chen Huiying, and Feng Zhe, “New Draft Rules on Subordinated 
Bonds Will Lower Banks’ Capital Adequacy Ratios and Reduce the Systemic 
Risk of Cross-Holding,” Caijing, August 24, 2009, http://english.caijing.com.
cn (accessed on August 24, 2009).
16. The CBRC starting in 2004 allowed banks to issue subordinated debt, 
which under certain conditions could be counted as part of their tier-two 
capital. The volumes issued in 2009 grew rapidly, to RMB236.7 billion in the 
first half of 2009 alone; see “China Lenders Asked to Rein in Record Loans,” 
People’s Daily Online, August 21, 2009, http://english.people.com.cn (accessed 
on August 21, 2009). For the year as a whole, banks issued subordinated 
debt valued at RMB266.9 billion; see People’s Bank of China, “The Financial 
Market Situation in 2009,” February 2, 2010, www.pbc.gov.cn (accessed on 
February 2, 2010). Thus once the new CBRC draft regulation was circulated 
in August, bank issuance of subordinated debt halted. 
17. “China Imposes Tougher Home Sale Tax to Control Bubble,” People’s Daily 
Online, December 10, 2009.
is, for example, in the United States or the United Kingdom. 
This is seen most clearly in the ratio of household debt to 
disposable income.
The  boom  years  in  the  United  States  and  some  other 
advanced industrial economies were fueled by a decline in 
the household saving rate and an increase in indebtedness, 
which allowed consumption to rise substantially more rapidly 
than household income, thus supercharging economic growth 
for a number of years. By the onset of the crisis, household 
indebtedness relative to disposable income (after-tax income) 
had risen to about 130 percent in the United States and even 
higher levels in the United Kingdom. In the United States 
much of this debt takes the form of mortgages, and in 2005 
and 2006 an increasing share of new mortgages was under-
written on lax terms known as subprime. As long as housing 
prices continued to rise the increase in household leverage 
was manageable. But when housing prices began to correct 
many property investors, who had paid little or nothing down, 
simply walked away from their properties and defaulted on 
their mortgages. The value of securities backed by subprime 
loans plummeted, leaving major financial institutions in the 
United States and Europe with gaping holes in their balance 
sheets, which ultimately had to be plugged by massive infu-
sions of government capital.
In  contrast,  Chinese  households  are  substantially  less 
leveraged.  Just  prior  to  the  crisis  at  year-end  2007  loans 
outstanding to households, including mortgages, auto loans, 
credit card debt, loans to proprietorships, and seasonal work-
ing  capital  loans  to  farmers  for  the  purchase  of  seeds  and 
fertilizer, stood at RMB5.1 trillion or 34 percent of household 
disposable income.18
Not only are Chinese households much less leveraged than 
their counterparts in several major advanced industrial coun-
tries but also the share of their debt devoted to the purchase 
of property is relatively small. In part this reflects the high 
downpayment ratios that the CBRC requires as a precondition 
to qualify for a mortgage on a residential property. Moreover, 
the Chinese regulator has never approved the introduction of 
home equity lines of credit, which inevitably increase lever-
age as the lines are drawn down. In part low household lever-
age reflects the not uncommon practice in China of buying 
residential property entirely with cash. Of households’ total 
borrowing  at  year-end  2007,  mortgage  debt  accounted  for 
RMB2.7 trillion, barely over half of all household debt, an 
amount equivalent to 18 percent of household income. In 
contrast, in the United States in the same year mortgage debt 
18. People’s Bank of China, “China’s Stable Financial Development in 2007,” 
January 11, 2008, www.pbc.gov.cn (accessed on January 11, 2008); National 
Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook 2009 (Beijing: China 
Statistics Press, 2009), 77.
Contrary to repeated criticisms, 
this stimulus had a substantial 
consumption component and focused 
on investment in infrastructure 
rather than expanding capacity in 
traditional industries such as steel. N u m b e r   P b 1 0 - 7  m a r c h   2 0 1 0
5
accounted for three-quarters of total household debt and was 
the equivalent of 100 percent of household disposable income. 
Put differently, relative to income, household mortgage debt 
in the United States is five times more than in China. 
The point is simple: A housing price correction in a market 
with a relatively small amount of leverage has implications that 
are quite different from a price correction in a much more highly 
leveraged market. In the former case defaults are likely to be few 
in number since property price declines would have to exceed 
20 percent before any owners reached negative equity. In the 
latter case, as in the United States, subprime loans frequently 
required no money down, so even a modest price correction 
put many owners into negative equity positions on their prop-
erty. As these subprime borrowers defaulted on their mortgages 
and went through foreclosure, their properties came back on 
to the market, reinforcing the property price correction, and 
thus pushing even more borrowers into a negative equity posi-
tion. As a result, defaults on subprime loans rose sharply and 
thus the value of securities backed by subprime and eventually 
even higher quality tranches of mortgages, such as Alt-A, plum-
meted. This threatened the viability of several major financial 
institutions that either held large amounts of such securities or 
had issued guarantees on the value of such securities.
Creation of Excess Capacity?
What about the assertion that the investment boom in 2009 
created excess capacity that will lead to downward pressure 
on prices and thus on firm profits, perhaps leading to defaults 
on the loans that financed the capacity expansion? This argu-
ment too seems not well founded. In a high-growth, high-
investment economy, such as China’s, some product sectors 
inevitably have at least temporary excess capacity. The issue, 
however, is whether this excess capacity is so widespread and 
enduring that it could contribute to deflation, putting down-
ward pressure on the profits of a large number of firms across 
many sectors. Such a situation would not only impair the abil-
ity of individual firms to repay their loans but also potentially 
lead to large-scale losses in the banking system. 
This does not appear to be the case in China for several 
reasons. First, Chinese firms historically have tended to hold 
on to outdated equipment, so that if demand for their product 
surged the firm could bring this old, higher-cost production 
capacity back on line. So Chinese data on excess capacity may 
overstate the extent of excess capacity compared with other 
countries. Second, there is a substantial difference between 
excess capacity of, say, 20 percent in a mature economy grow-
ing at 2 to 3 percent per year and 20 percent excess capacity in 
China, where growth has averaged about 10 percent for three 
decades. In the mature economy the cost of financing excess 
capacity for the seven or eight years it might take demand 
to catch up with potential supply would be substantial and 
probably put enormous financial pressure on the firms that 
had built the excess capacity. But in China 20 percent excess 
capacity would likely be absorbed in a year or two. 
Steel  is  most  commonly  cited  as  an  industry  that  has 
tended to excess capacity in China. A recent European Cham-
ber report estimated that China’s excess production capacity 
in steel at year-end 2008 was between 100 million and 200 
million  metric  tons,  which  translates  into  excess  capacity 
between  15  and  30  percent.19  This  estimated  overcapacity 
alone is more than the steel output of the two next largest 
global steel producers—Japan and the United States. 
But this analysis fails to adequately consider the pace of 
growth of apparent steel consumption in China, which has 
been  over  15  percent  annually  between  2000  and  2008.20 
In 2009 China’s apparent steel consumption soared by 107 
million  metric  tons.  In  short,  what  appeared  to  outside 
observers to be massive excess capacity at year-end 2008 may 
have been mostly absorbed in 2009. If not it will likely be 
absorbed in 2010. 
Finally, it is important to note that the stimulus-fueled 
investment  boom  of  2009  was  not  focused  on  expanding 
production capacity in China’s traditional industries, such as 
steel, as is widely claimed. One important indicator of this is 
the sectoral allocation of medium- and long-term bank loans. 
These are loans of more than one year, which are used to finance 
fixed investment, as opposed to loans of a year or less, which 
are used to finance working capital. In 2009 medium- and 
long-term loans outstanding expanded by RMB4.9 trillion, 
accounting for almost half of the increase in renminbi lend-
ing by the banking system that year. Of these loans financing 
fixed investment, only 10.2 percent, or RMB502.5 billion, 
were extended to manufacturing firms. Fifty percent went to 
infrastructure projects, 13.1 percent to leasing and business 
services, and 10.2 percent to property.21
We  can  also  examine  the  composition  of  investment, 
19. European Chamber, Overcapacity in China: Causes, Impacts and Recom-
mendations, November 26, 2009, 20.
20. Apparent steel consumption is steel production minus net exports. This 
series is compiled by World Steel Dynamics.
21. People’s Bank of China, Monetary Policy Analysis Small Group, Report on 
the Implementation of Monetary Policy, Fourth Quarter 2009, 3.
The charge of excessive lending growth 
fails to take into account that the 
authorities initiated steps to slow 
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whether financed by medium- and long-term loans or by the 
internal cash flow of the corporate sector. Steel investment in 
2009 was substantial, about RMB400 billion. But the growth 
of investment in the steel industry in 2009 was minimal, only 
3 percent compared with an increase of investment for the 
economy as a whole of 30 percent. Again, this reflects the 
priorities of the stimulus program—more for infrastructure 
and less for traditional industries such as steel. Investment in 
the rail network, for example, rose 67.5 percent in 2009.22
Hidden Government Debts Threatening Fiscal 
Sustainability?
The third critique to examine is that China’s stimulus has led 
to a massive increase in implicit government debt that ulti-
mately could threaten government finances. Since the stimulus 
in 2009 was financed by credit rather than deficit spending, 
government debt remains low. But much of the medium- and 
long-term bank lending for infrastructure investment went to 
local quasi-government agencies, called local investment or 
platform companies.23 Although local governments legally are 
not allowed to borrow or to run budget deficits, lending to 
these local investment companies is legal. Critics argue that 
these  platform  companies  are  unlikely  to  be  able  to  repay 
22. These are increases in what the Chinese statistical authorities call fixed 
asset investment, a measure that overstates the growth of capital formation. 
While the data on fixed asset investment are biased upward the relative rates 
of expansion of fixed asset investment in steel compared with the economy as 
a whole is likely to be a good indicator of the modest growth of capital forma-
tion in the steel industry in 2009. National Bureau of Statistics of China, 
“Main Statistical Data in 2009,” January 21, 2010, www.stats.gov.cn (accessed 
on January 21, 2010).
23. These are also sometimes referred to in secondary sources as conduit 
companies or urban development and construction companies.
these loans and that the obligation to repay will ultimately fall 
on local governments. The view that the repayment burden 
could fall on local governments is quite reasonable since in 
many instances local governments have provided guarantees 
for these loans.
How large might the debt of these platform companies 
be?  To  start  with,  consider  medium-  and  long-term  bank 
lending that the central bank specifically identifies as going 
to infrastructure projects. These loans amounted to RMB1.1 
trillion and RMB2.5 trillion in 2008 and 2009, respectively.24 
If we assume that all of these infrastructure loans went to local 
investment companies and that none of the loans of this type 
made in the five years 2005–09 has been repaid, the bank debt 
of these platform companies at year-end 2009 would have 
been  RMB5.666  trillion.25  These  firms  also  issue  bonds,  a 
reported RMB121.2 billion in 2009, slightly more than what 
they issued in the previous four years.26 Adding bank borrow-
ing and bond issuance brings the total debt of local investment 
companies to approximately RMB5.9 trillion.
An alternative to this bottom-up approach is to look for 
authoritative Chinese estimates of the debt. Ba Shusong, the 
deputy director of the Institute of Finance of the Development 
Research  Center,  a  leading  government  think  tank,  placed 
the debt of local investment companies at mid-year 2009 at 
more than RMB5 trillion, up from about RMB1 trillion at 
the  beginning  of  2008.27  Adding  medium-  and  long-term 
infrastructure lending by banks in the second half of 2009 
and bond issuance by these firms in the second half to Ba’s 
mid-year figure of more than RMB5 trillion brings the total 
debt to RMB6 trillion, very close to the bottom-up estimate 
just laid out.28
RMB6 trillion is equal to almost a fifth of China’s GDP, 
roughly equal to the outstanding government debt issued by 
the Ministry of Finance and equal to 15 percent of all the loans 
24. People’s Bank of China, Monetary Policy Analysis Small Group, Report on 
the Implementation of Monetary Policy, Fourth Quarter 2008, 4; Report on the 
Implementation of Monetary Policy, Fourth Quarter 2009,  3.
25. Medium- and long-term infrastructure lending in 2005, 2006, and 2007 
was RMB617.50 billion, RMB650.48 billion, and RMB 798.36 billion, 
respectively.
26. Andrew Batson, “China’s Localities Feel Pinch of Tighter Credit,” Wall 
Street Journal, February 25, 2010, http://online.wsj.com (accessed on Febru-
ary 25, 2010). The issuance of bonds in the first 11 months of 2009 almost 
equaled bond issuance by these companies in the previous four years. Xu Lin, 
“Taming ‘Local Government Inc.,’” China Reform 316, January 15, 2010, 
http://englishcaing.com.cn (accessed on March 12, 2010).
27. Wang Bo, “Systematic Risks Warning,” China Daily, November 9, 2009, 
7.
28. In the second half of 2009 banks extended RMB900 billion of medium- 
and long-term loans for infrastructure and local investment companies issued 
RMB55.2 billion in bonds. See Xu Lin, “Taming ‘Local Government Inc.’”
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outstanding from the banking system.29 In short, by almost any 
standard the borrowing of local platform companies is large.
Judging the platform companies’ ability to service their 
debt is difficult. One concern is that some services provided 
by these quasi-government agencies are substantially under-
priced.  Despite  increases  in  tariffs  over  the  last  decade  or 
more, most local water companies have lost money every year 
since the mid-1990s.30 Similarly, the fares on subway systems 
in China are so low that fare box revenue probably does not 
even cover operating costs. Thus the underpricing of these 
services impairs the ability of these quasi-government agencies 
to repay their loans. To the extent to which platform compa-
nies invest in activities that do not generate revenue, their 
ability to repay is even more impaired. 
While the financial returns to some of the investments 
undertaken by platform companies may be modest, it is likely 
that the real economic returns of these investments to the 
economy as a whole on average will be high. China is in the 
midst of the largest rural-to-urban migration in global history. 
Thus the demand for services in urban areas is rising rapidly 
and the real economic returns to infrastructure investment are 
likely to be high. Indeed, unlike India, where insufficient infra-
structure investment has been a brake on economic growth, 
rapid infrastructure development in China has facilitated and 
stimulated superior growth performance.
Moreover,  while  some  local  investment  companies  may 
have weak cash flow, they nevertheless have substantial assets. At 
year-end 2009 their assets amounted to RMB8 trillion, about 
one-third more than our estimate of their outstanding debt.31 
Thus lending to these companies is not likely to have the same 
adverse consequences as did large-scale bank lending to chronic 
money-losing  state-owned  companies  in  the  mid-1990s.  At 
that time many of these state-owned borrowers had liabilities 
far exceeding their assets so when they were ultimately closed 
and liquidated banks recovered little or nothing.32 Ultimately, 
the government had to inject about RMB3.4 trillion into the 
banking system to facilitate its restructuring.33 
29. This is substantially below Victor Shih’s estimate of RMB11 trillion; see 
Victor Shih, “China’s 8,000 Credit Risks,” Asian Wall Street Journal, February 
8, 2010, http://online.wsj.com (accessed on February 12, 2010). It is above a 
figure of RMB5 trillion given by the People’s Daily, an agency of the Chinese 
Communist Party; see “China on High Alert for Large-Scale Bad Loans,” 
People’s Daily Online, February 25, 2010.
30. “High Price for Water Reform?” People’s Daily Online, October 29, 2009, 
http://english.people.com.cn (accessed on October 29, 2009).
31. “China on High Alert for Large-Scale Bad Loans,” People’s Daily Online, 
February 25, 2010.
32. Nicholas R. Lardy, China’s Unfinished Economic Revolution (Washington: 
Brookings Institution, 1998), 43,142–43.
33. Ma Guonan, “Who Pays China’s Bank Restructuring Bill?” CEPII 
In short, local investment companies may be unable to 
repay a substantial portion of their borrowings. Ultimately, 
municipalities and other local governments will probably have 
to assume the responsibility for repaying much of the borrow-
ing of the quasi-government agencies in their jurisdiction. But 
the infrastructure provided through local investment compa-
nies  likely  will  contribute  to  China’s  sustained  economic 
growth and thus to increasing government tax revenues as 
well. Moreover, local governments are likely to continue to 
enjoy substantial income from the leasing of land, revenue 
that is not reflected in local government budgets. Needless 
to say, if borrowing by local investment companies were to 
continue at the pace observed in 2008 and 2009 the outlook 
would be much less sanguine. 
Neglect of Consumption?
The charge that the stimulus program focused excessively on 
expanding investment demand and has set back China’s efforts 
to  achieve  more  balanced  growth  by  encouraging  private 
consumption  seems  wrong.  Consumption  growth  in  2009 
was actually quite robust; indeed on the basis of preliminary 
data it appears that 2009 was the first year since 2000 that 
the growth of consumption outstripped the growth of GDP. 
Thus the long-term decline in the consumption share of GDP 
probably ended, at least temporarily, in 2009. 
During a year in which GDP expansion was the slow-
est in almost a decade, how could consumption growth have 
been so strong in relative terms? In the early months of 2009 
employment  in  export-oriented  industries  was  collapsing, 
with a reported loss of 20 million jobs in export manufactur-
ing centers along the southeast coast, most notably in Guang-
dong Province.34
Several factors explain this unexpectedly strong growth 
of  consumption  in  2009.  First,  the  boom  in  investment, 
particularly in construction activities, appears to have offset 
a large portion of the job losses in the export sector. Thus 
employment of rural migrant workers, largely in construction 
as well as in coastal export industries, quickly recovered. And 
in the more formal labor market in urban areas, by year-end 
2009 11.02 million jobs were created, very nearly matching 
the 11.13 million jobs created in 2008.35 
Working Paper No. 2006-4 (Centre D’etudes Prospective et D’informations 
Internationales, February 2006), 22.
34. “20 Million Migrants Lost Jobs: Survey,” China Daily, February 3, 2009, 
www.chinadaily.com.cn (accessed on March 15, 2010).
35. Wen Jiabao, Report on Work of the Government, March 5, 2009, www.npc.
gov.cn (accessed on April 13, 2009); Report on Work of the Government, March 
5, 2010, www.npc.gov.cn (accessed on March 24, 2010).N u m b e r   P b 1 0 - 7  m a r c h   2 0 1 0
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Second,  the  government  continued  to  raise  transfer 
payments to China’s lowest income residents and to increase 
payments to those drawing pensions. Transfer payments to 
about 70 million of China’s lowest income citizens rose by a 
third or RMB20 billion in 2009.36 Monthly pension payments 
for enterprise retirees increased by RMB120 or 10 percent 
in January 2009, almost double the 5.9 percent increase in 
consumer prices in 2008.37 This raised payments to retirees by 
about RMB75 billion.38 The increases in employment, transfer 
payments, and pension income contributed to a 9.8 percent 
increase in the disposable income of urban residents and an 
increase of 8.5 percent in the net income of rural residents in 
2009.39 
Third,  the  government,  recognizing  it  could  not  rely 
entirely on increased investment to offset the drag on growth 
from  shrinking  exports,  adopted  several  additional  specific 
measures to encourage consumption as part of its stimulus 
program. In 2009 the government cut by half the 10 percent 
tax on vehicles with small-displacement engines. In addition 
the government allocated RMB45 billion in subsidies to rural 
residents trading in old vehicles and home appliances. These 
subsidies alone probably boosted rural consumption by more 
than 1 percent.40 These incentives contributed to an almost 
50 percent increase in vehicle sales nationally and a massive 
increase in the sale of consumer durables in rural areas. 
Fourth,  substantial  increases  in  household  borrowing 
bolstered consumption in 2009. Loans outstanding to house-
holds grew by RMB2.5 trillion, almost four times the increase 
of 2008.41 RMB1.4 trillion of this was used to finance the 
purchase of housing. The remainder, RMB1.1 trillion, might 
be considered an upward bound estimate of the amount of this 
increased borrowing that was devoted to financing consump-
36. Ministry of Civil Affairs, “Statistical Communiqué on Program Develop-
ment,” March 5, 2010, http://files.mca.gov.cn (accessed on March 12, 2010).
37. This was the fifth consecutive year in which retirees from enterprises 
received increases in their monthly pensions; “China to Raise Pensions from 
2010,” People’s Daily Online, December 23, 2009, http://english.people.com.
cn (accessed on December 23, 2009).
38. Calculated based on an average of 51 million enterprise retirees in 2009.
39. National Bureau of Statistics of China, “Main Statistical Data in 2009,” 
January 21, 2010.
40. RMB45 billion is equal to 1.7 percent of rural consumption expenditures 
in 2008. If rural consumption grew by as much as 10 percent in 2009 the 
subsidy would be equal to 1.5 percent of consumption in 2009.
41. The increase in lending to households is a comprehensive measure that 
includes mortgages, credit card debt, auto loans, seasonal working capital loans 
to farmers to finance seed and fertilizer purchases, and loans to proprietorships 
and other unincorporated businesses. When farmers and proprietors have 
improved access to working capital from banks, they can devote more of the 
income from their farms and small businesses to personal consumption.
tion expenditures. This is a substantial amount, in excess of 3 
percent of GDP. 
These  factors  combined  boosted  urban  consumption, 
which  accounts  for  three-quarters  of  private  consumption 
expenditures, by 10.1 percent in real terms, well ahead of the 
pace of GDP growth.
summary
China  faces  major  challenges  in  sustaining  its  economic 
growth in a period of weak global recovery, particularly in 
Europe. In 2009 China’s net exports of goods and services 
dropped  precipitously,  resulting  in  a  substantial  drag  on 
economic growth.42 To overcome this drag China launched a 
massive stimulus program, financed largely with bank credit. 
Contrary to repeated criticisms, this stimulus had a substantial 
consumption component and directed investment primarily 
toward infrastructure rather than expanding capacity in tradi-
tional industries such as steel. 
But the stimulus did come at a cost insofar as it led to 
a  substantial  increase  in  the  implicit  debt  of  local  govern-
ments.  The  authorities  recognize  flooding  the  economy 
with more credit is not the way forward and that they will 
have  to  take  strong  additional  policy  initiatives  to  sustain 
economic growth. These include raising the prices of inputs 
such as water, electricity, and other resource products as well 
as introducing realistic environmental taxes and fees. These 
reforms, as well as a more flexible exchange rate, would reduce 
the distortions that for much of the past decade have favored 
industrial growth and exports over services and consumption 
and would contribute to sustaining China’s impressive long-
term economic growth.
42. The drag was calculated at 3.9 percentage points by China’s statistical 
authority. That means to achieve growth of 8.7 percent domestic demand 
increased by 12.6 percent, which is the fastest pace of increase in domestic 
demand in more than a decade.
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